Interest rates and monetary growth by Jerry L. Jordan
I.
4 IJDGING from comments in newspapers and re-
~orts on numerous “outlook conferences” that have
taken place recently, there is a clear consensus among
economic analysts that 1973 will be a year of con-
tinued strong economic growth. The main areas of
disagreement appear to be with regard to the outlook
for interest rates and prices on one band, and the
appropriate monetary stance on the other.
This articlereviews financial and monetary develop-
ments during 1972 with emphasis on a few of the
more important factors that have contributed to the
growth of monetary and reserve aggregates. The dis-
cussion concentrates on movements in interest rates
and savings deposits at financial intermediaries, The
magnitudes discussed are seen as being interrelated,
and the inp]ications for 1973 emphasize the apparent
short-run trade—offs involved in both achieving a
moderate monetary growth aml dampening a tendency
for interest rates to rise.
An essential element for assessing the factors con-
tributing to the growth of monetary aggregates in
1973 is an evaluation of the prospects for market
interest rates — especially rates on short—term securi-
ties. The analysis presented here suggests that there is
considerable reason to expect market forces to result
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in upward pressure on short-term interest rates in the
near future.
There are tsvo ways in which past tendencies for
interest rates to rise have influenced growth of the
nation’s money stock. First, a primary short-run ob-
jective of central bank policy for many years has been
to moderate any tendencies for market interest rates
to change sharply.1 On previous occasions when there
has been substantial upward pressure on market rates,
policymakers have responded by increasing purchases
of securities in the open market, thereby increasing
bank reserves and loanable funds which temporarily
dampens the rise in rates. Such actions increase the
amount of Federal Reserve credit and monetary base
extended to the economy.2 Over a period of several
months, the rate of growth of the money stock is
similar to the growth of the base.
The second way in which movements in interest
rates have influenced the growth of money has been
by influencing savings flows to commercial banks, Dur-
ing past periods when market interest rates have risen
iFor annual reviews of nionetarv acifons of the Federal
Open Market Committee for the years 1966-1971, see the
following reprints from this Bank’s Review: 22, 28, 39, 57, 68
and 76.
2Leonall C Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary Base —
Explanation and Analytical Use,” this Review (August 1988),
pp. 7-11.
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Interest Rates
significantly compared to the rates banks have been
permitted to pay on time and savings deposits — such
as 1966 and 1969 — the growth of these deposits has
slowed considerably. A slowing in the growth of these
deposits results in an increase in the “money supply
multiplier.”3 This means that the growth rate of money
would tend to accelerate compared to the growth of
the base as the growth of time and savings deposits
slows.
INTEREST RAII’E MOVEMENTS
This section presents a discussion of interest rate
movements during the current economic expansion
and an assessment of some of the factors that will
influence the pattern of market interest rates in 1973.
In addition, it includes an analysis of the interrelation
between the financing of Government deficits and
changes in interest rates.
Two striking characteristics of the past few years
are the sharp movements in the yields on market-
able short-term Treasury securities and the per-
sistence of huge deficits in the Federal Government’s
1
For a discussion of the multiplier, see Jerry L. Jordan, “Ele-
ments of Money Stock Determination,” this Review (October
1969), pp. 10-19, and Albert E. Burger, The Money Supply
Process (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Com-
pany, Inc., 1971).
budget. On the surface, the decline in the interest
rates on Treasury bills that occurredin late 1971 seems
to conflict with what one would expect in a period of
growing Government deficits and strong economic
growth. Other things equal, increases in the supply
of Government securities to the market tend to put
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analysis of factors influencing the demand for short-
term U.S. Government securities provides an explana-
tion of recent developments and may be useful in
assessing the forces influencing market rates in the
near future.
The yields on short-term marketable securities fell
markedly following the onset of the economic contrac-
tion of 1969-70. As in previotos recessionary episodes,
the decline in short-term interest rates was much
greater than the decline in long-term rates. Early
in 1971 the movement of short-term rates reversed
sharply, and the rise in these rates through July of
that year was as steep as the preceding decline.
Then in August 1971 the market forces influencing
supplies of and demands for all types of goods, serv-
ices, and assets — including financial — were given a
shock by the dramatic Governmental imposition of a
“New Economic Program.” Over the subsequent few
months the yields on short-term securities, such as
Treasury bills, tumbled to or below their lows of a
year earlier. This development was in the direction
consistent with the effects of uncertainty associated
with the surprise announcement of a “wage and price
freeze” followed by a control program.4 Also, part of
the downward adjustment in market interest rates
may have been in response to a reduction in the
anticipated rate of future inflation, Moreover, the
foreign aspects of the program contributed to the rapid
decline in short-term interest rates.
As a part of the “New Economic Program;’ the
President announced that the United States was sus-
pending until further notice its commitment to con-
vert dollar holdings of foreign central banks into gold
and other reserve assets. Although in practice there
had been only limited exchanges of gold for dollars
since early 1968, the announcement officially “floated”
the dollar in international exchange markets. The re-
sult of this action was to broaden speculation that
the exchange rates between the dollar and other major
currencies would change. Consequently, there were
opportunities for realizing capital gains and avOiding
capital losses by moving out of dollar assets and into
Foreign assets.
4
One effect of the announcement of the freeze and forth-
coming control program was to create considerable uncer-
tainty about output prices, costs of inputs to production, and
competitive factors. In such a situation, businessmen and
participants in securities markets usually choose to move to
relatively more liquid positions in their portfolios of earning
assets. The effect is to increase the relative demand for




In 1971 both foreign and U.S. private investors
shifted from a broad spectrum of earning assets in
this country (for example. common stocks and bonds)
and into assets denominated in foreign currencies
(such as stocks and bonds sold for domestic currencies
on foreign stock exchanges).~ This activity tended to
increase the dollar prices of foreign currencies in ex-
change markets, Foreign central banks, in an effort to
moderate the rise in their exchange rates, responded
by acquiring dollars in exchange for their domestic
currencies.
After foreign central banks acquire dollars in in-
ternational exchange transactions, they normally pur-
chase U.S. Treasury bills and other Federal debt
instrnments. In the past three years foreign official
agencies acquired extremely large quantities of short-
term Government securities, As the chart entitled
“Ownership of Federal Government Debt” shows, al-
most all of the huge increase in net Federal debt6
since mid—1970 has been acquired by foreigners.
In summary of this point, during the past few years
private foreign and U.S. investors increased their hold-
ings of earning assets denominated in foreign curren-
cies. These actions led foreign central banks to acquire
increasing amounts of dollars as they attempted to
maintam relatively fixed parities in exchange rates.
The greatly increased demand for short-term U.S.
Government securities by these foreign institutions
resulted in lower market yields on these securities
relative to other marketable securities than had pre-
viously been the case. This development occurred in
spite of the large U.S. Government deficits that pre-
vailed in the period.
~ YiciOrie
The average of selected yields on highest grade
long-tenn corporate bonds changed little in 1972.
There was a slight tendency for these interest rates
to fall during the year, but the variation was less than
in any year since the mid-1960s. At an average of
about 7.2 percent for the year, this measure of private
bond yields was somewhat below the prior year and
1
For an exteaded discussion of the relationship between short-
term international capital flows and domestic market interest
rates, see Anatol Balbach, “Will Capital Reflows Induce
Domestic Interest Rate Changes?,” this Review (July 1972),
pp. 2-5.
6
Net Government debt is Federal Covernment debt net of
debt held by U.S. Covemnient agencies and trust funds.
This series includes debt held by the Federal Reserve System,
private domestic investors, and state and local governments,
as ‘veIl as investments of foreign and international accounts
in the United States,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1973
well below the historic peak of about 8.5 percent
reached in mid-1970.
The average yield on long-term U.S. Government
securities remained unchanged on balance last year.
Since the yields on Aaa corporate bonds edged down-
ward, the differential between these series narrowed.
As the chart on yield spreads between these long-tenn
securities shows (see page 6), throughout the post-
war period until 1966, the differential between these
series had remained in a fairly narrow range of no
more than one-half of one percentage point. This
difference evidently reflected the market’s evaluation
of the difference in risk and liquidity associated with
the bonds.
In the mid-1960s the average yield on long-term
bonds began rising significantly. Increases in long-
term market interest rates are often viewed to be a
result of rising anticipations of greater inflation in the
future. In view of the acceleration in the rate of in-
crease in the consumer and general price indexes
that was observed beginning in the mid—l960s, it is
generally assumed that savers began to demand a
higher nominal yield in order to compensate for the
erosion of purchasing power attributable to the infla-
tion. At the same time, borrowers were willing to pay
higher interest rates since they anticipated repaying
indebtedness with depreciated dollars some years in
the future.
From early 1966 until late 1971, the interest rate
differential between highest gi-ade corporate bonds
and long—term Government bonds became increasingly
wide. The sharp rise in this spread in the second half
of the 1960s resulted from both the rising market in-
terest rates and a long—standing statute prohibiting the
Federal Government from paying yields greater than
4.25 percent on debt maturities of over seven years.7
Once the market yields had risen to the level that
a 4.25 percent coupon rate on long-term Govern-
ment obligations was no longer competitive, the U.S.
Treasury ceased to issue long-term securities.
7
0n April 4, 1918, under the Second Liberty Bond Act,
Congress established a maximusu interest rate of 4.25 percent
on long-term bonds. On March 17, 1971, under Public Law
92-5, Congress authorized the issuance of long-term U.S. ob-
ligations, in an aggregate annount not exceeding $10 billion,
without regard to the statutory 4.25 pci-cent limitation.
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The outstanding volume of long-term Government
bonds began to decline in early 1966. Of the out-
standing debt, a portion was maturing at regular in-
tervals, hut the Treasury was unable to refinance with
new long-term obligations. The total amount of Gov-
ernment debt rose substantially in subsequent years,
but all new issues of Treasury securities carried ma-
turities of less than seven years.
Thus, there has been a steady decline in the out-
standing stock of long-term Government bonds since
early 1966. Presumably there was also some decline
in the demand (shift of the demand schedule) for
these bonds since the yields on close substitute earn-
ing assets became increasingly more attractive. How-
ever, various financial institutions, such as insurance
companies and banks, for legal or traditional reasons
choose to hold some portion of their portfolios of
liquid assets in the form of Treasury bonds. Gonse-
quently, in view of the steady decline in the out-
standing volume of these bonds, investors were willing
— r~
—~ —. 5k



















9952 9953 9954 1955 9956 9951 9958 1959 1960 9969 9962 9963 1964 1965 9966 9967 1968 9969 1970 9971 9972 1973
OF, Ày’S 4, inFO, ,,n,d,,th, S,,,,nd Lib,nFy R,nd A,’, C’’g”,’ ,o,bFF,h,d ,,,,i,’,, i,F,,,nn ‘F, nF4I~%,, F,,~-’e,,, b~’d,.0’ Mn,FF, F?, Fy71. ‘‘den y,bFi, Ly,, 92-5, C,,
9
,,,,
,,nF,,,i,,d-’h,i,,,,,y, ‘Fl ~ U.S. ybliy’Fi’’, - I, on,g,’’n,F, ,,,,, F n,n,,,,,d.ng SF0 6FFFi,,, — iA,,F,,y,,d’,~h ‘nF,~’,Fn’y4¼% IF,iF,h,n. Ti, ‘0,8,8





Volume of Marketable Long-Term Government Bonds
















9951 1953 1954 9955 9956 9957 1958 1959 9960 9969 1962 9963 1964 1965 1966 9967 9968 1969 1970 1971 9972 1973
0, An,FI 4,1919, “8’’ Fh, 5n~’nd LF
6
’niy 6y,d Ay,, Cy’~”n ,‘‘,bFi,h,d ‘‘‘‘inn,, i,F,n,,Fn,F, nF4i,% ,, I,,
9





,,,nF,,,,,nF .,e,,,,,di,~5FSbiFii,,,ith,,’ ‘,~“d ,y’he,’,,,,’y,y4½’;0Fi’,it,6’,1F’e,h,dyd,nen
‘,y,,,,’F’Fh, ye’l~d,h,F Fh,4i~% ,,iFi,g FF~ i~e~d ‘‘‘0,1 ,,,,ny,,F I,nn.Fnnn, O,,n,,,,,,n 6,,8, 8,, F~h i~h,n‘‘‘0,’ yi,Fdn
L,Fe,F 8,,, yly,,,d. 3,8 qne’,e’
40
30
Page 6FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1973
to pay increasingly greater relative prices (aecept
lower relative yields) for Treasury bonds as compared
to corporate bonds.
In 1971 Gongress passed legislation suspending the
ceiling on the interest rate the Treasury was allowed
to offer on a limited volume of bonds with maturities
of more than seven years.8 Also, in 1971 the yield
spread between seasoned corporate and Goverrnnent
bonds reached a peak and since has begun to narrow.
The newl issued long-term Treasury securities in
1972 and early 1973 carried coupon yields that were
significantly higher than the market yield on the out-
standing bonds.
In 1972 the Treasury continued to finance most of
its deficits and refinance maturing obligations by is-
suing short-term securities. The yields in the market
on short-term instruments were significantly lower than
yields on long-term bonds, and therefore the interest
cost to the Treasury was lower. Also, as of early
January 1973 the Treasury had issued about $7.5 bil-
lion out of an authority of $10 billion for bonds bearing
coupon rates greater than 4.25 percent.
Analysis of supply and demand factors suggests
that as the yields on short-term securities rise further,
the Treasury would have increasing incentive to seek
proportionally greater amounts of its financing require-
ments through the issuance of longer-term obligations.
Such a development would tend to result in an up-
ward trend in the average yield of Treasury bonds
as long as the interest rate on the newly issued bonds
is greater than the average of outstanding bonds.
However, the Treasury is already close to the $10
billion limitation and, unless additional authority is
obtained, the outstanding volume of long-term debt
will continue to decline.
GB,()’•VTH Oi:~IN( )\4~f’AN!) S4A ])4(.)
iini’innre
The current expansion has been marked by a strong
growth in ps-e—tax personal income.” From the third
quarter of 1971 to the third quarter of 1972, personal
income rose 8.3 percent, compared with a 6.7 percent
rise in the previous four quarters. Adjusted for the
effects of inflation, the growth in the most recent four
quarters was 5.9 percent, more than twice the 2.7 per-




“For a description of this and related series, see the screened
section on page 8.
Growth of disposable (after-tax) personal income
recently has been somewhat less rapid. Since the
third quarter of 1971 disposable income in current
prices has risen only 6.4 percent, down from both the
7.3 percent of the prior year and the 8.7 percent from
the third quarter of 1969 to the corresponding quarter
in 1970.30 The slower growth of disposable income in
1972 may be partially attributable to overwithholding
of personal income taxes. In real terms disposable in-
come rose at a 4.2 percent rate in the most recent four
quarters, up from 3.3 percent in the prior year and
the same as the rate prevailing for the period from
third quarter 1969 to third quarter 1970.
7’ at~iri.g
The recent acceleration in the growth of income
has been accompanied by a slowing in the growth of
personal saving.’1 Even though there has been an in-
crease in the proportion of personal income that has
gone to taxes, the rates of growth of personal outlays
in recent years have been similar to the growth of
personal income before taxes. Gonsequemitly, the sav-
ing rate has fallen fairly sharply in the last year. The
proportion of dlisposahle income that was saved fell
from mid-1968 to mid-1969, mainly as a result of the
imposition of a surcharge on personal and corporate
Federal income taxes. Saved income then returned
lllThroughout most of this section, time period references
avoid the fourth quarter of 1970 because of the distortions
caused by the major labor strike in the auto industry that
occurred at that time.
“l
7
or an economic discussion of saving and its relation to in-
come and wealth, see Aroma A. Alcbian and William R.
Allen, University Economics, 3rd ed. (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Conipany, Inc., 1972), especially pp.
189-190.
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to previous ratios as tax rates were gradually lowered.
On balance during the decade prior to 1968, indi-
viduals allocated an increasing share of their income
to saving. For historical comparison, personal savings
increased at almost a 7 percent average annual rate
from 1957 to 1967, about one percentage point faster




The growth of savings-type deposits at financial
intermediaries remained strong in 1972, despite the
decline in the personal saving rate. Net time deposits
at commercial banks5’ rose 13 percent from Decem-
ber 1971 to December 1972, somewhat slower Than
the 17 percent increase in deposits at savings and loan
associations andmutual savings banks, On balance, the
growth of deposits in banks and nonbank thrift insti-
tutions has been very rapid since early 1970. In 1969
the growth of these savings-type deposits was greatly
12
Total time deposits at all commercial banks -minus negotiable
time certificates of deposit issued in denominations of
$100,000 or more by large weekly reporting commercial
banks.
curtailed as a result of the relatively high interest rates
available on short-term marketable securities, as com-
pared to the yields that banks, savings and loan asso-
ciations, and mutual savings banks were allowed to
offer.1’
Other interest bearing liabilities of commercial banks
consist mainly of marketable certificates of deposit
in denominations of $100,000 or more. During 1969
the outstanding volume of the large-size bank time
deposits fell sharply since the maximum rates banks
were allowed to pay on these deposits were signifi-
cantly below the yields available on alternative mar-
ketable earning assets. Since early 1970 these deposits
have grown rapidly.
The interest rates paid by banks on these large
denomination deposits rose substantially in 1972, but
prevailing offering rates were still well below legal
maximums at year-end.14 The movement in the yields
‘
3
The Board of Governors, under provisions of Regulation Q,
establishes maximum rates which may he paid by member
banks of the Federal Reserve System. However, a member
hank may ant pay a rate in excess of the maximum rate on
similar deposits under the laws of the state in which the
member hank is located. Beginning February 1936, maximum
rates which may he paid by nonmember insured commercial
banks, as established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, have been the same as those in effect for member
banks. Beginning September 1966 rates paid by Federally
insured mntual savifigs banks were brought under the control
of the FDIC, and rates paid at savings and loan associations
were brought under the control of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. That legislation also required the three
regulatory agencies to consult with each other when con-
siderh,g changes in the ceiling rates. For a discussion of inter-
est rates and Regulation Q, see Clifton B. Luttrell, “Interest
Rate Controls — Perspective, Purpose, and Problems,” this
Review (September 1968), pp. 6-14, and Charlotte F. Rueb-
hug, “The Administration of Regulation Q,” this Review
(February 1970), pp. 29-40.
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on bank-issued CDs since early last year has accom-
panied the rise in interest rates available on other
short-term marketable securities.
C k~ 3’C, 3
The growth of the nation’s money stock has been
successively greater in each of the past fonr years.
In 1972 the money stock increased 8.2 percent, com-
pared with 6,2 percent in 1971, 5.4 percent in 1970,
and 3.2 percent in 1969. The pattern of money growth
has been quite uneven within recent years. Generally
money has grown more rapidly in the first half of
the year than in the second (on a seasonally adjusted
basis).
The primary factor determining the trend growth
of money is the monetary base.15 From late 1986 to
late 1971 the base rose at a 5.8 percent trend rate,
compared with the 5.9 percent trend rate of growth
of money in the same period. In 1972 the base in-
creased 8.3 percent, no-t much different than the rise
in money.
Several factors contributed to the rapid growth of
the monetary base last year. The table on page 12 of
this Review summarizes the net changes in the source
components of the base since the end of 1971. Some
of the major factors contributing to the change in the
base were monetization of gold, an increase in mem-
ber bank borrowings, growth of Federal Reserve hold-
ings of Government securities, and lower average re-
serve requirements.
The increase in the monetary base that resulted
from the monetization of gold was a one-time effect
that occurred in May 1972 after Congress approved a
lOThe monetary base is defined as the net monetary liabilities of
the U. S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System held
by commercial banks and the nonbank public. These mon-
etary liabilities are member bank reserves and currency
in the hands of the public. The monetary base is derived
from a consolidated balance sheet of the Treasury and
Federal Reserve “monetary” accounts. For a more detailed
discussion of the monetary base, see Andersen and Jordan,
“Monetary Base,” pp. 7-11; Jordan, “Money Stock Determina-
tion,” pp. 10-19; Jane Anderson and Thomas M. Humphrey,
“Determinants of Change in the Money Stock: 1960-1970,”
Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank
0
f Richmond (March
1972), pp. 2-8; John D. Rca, “Sources of Money Growth in
1970 and 1971,” Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
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change in the price of gold from $35 to $38 per
ounce. For the year, the net effect on the base of
changes in gold was only $278 million, even though
the effect of the devaluation of the dollar in terms of
gold was over $800 million. The difference is due to
the fact that in the first two months of last year, the
U.S. gold stock declined as the Treasury fulfilled prior
obligations.
Member bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve
Banks were at very low levels at the beginning of 1972
since short-term market interest rates were well be-
low the System’s 4.5 percent discount rate. As the
year progressed the yields in the market rose and
borrowings by banks from the Federal Reserve moved
to higher average levels. On balance for the year
(December 1971 to December 1972) member bank
borrowings rose almost $950 million which, other
things equal, accounted for about 23 percent of the
total rise in the source base.’6
Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. Government se-
curities are determined by open market operations in
accord with the instructions of the Federal Open
Market Committee. A purchase (sale) of securities
in the market results in an increase (decrease) in
bank reserves. By buying Government securities, the
Federal Reserve monetizes the debt and, in effect,
reduces the outstanding stock of publicly held interest-
bearing Treasury liabilities.
76
1’he “source base” refers to a consolidation of Treasury and
Federal Reserve monetary accounts, The monetary hase is
equal to the source base plus an adjustment for the amount
of reserves that are released or absorbed by changes in
effective required reserve ratios. Further explanation is avail-
able from this Bank on request.
Monetary Base*
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In November 1972 the Federal Reserve imple-
mented changes in two of its regulations which have
a bearing on usable reserves available to the banking
system. Effective in two steps beginning November
9, the Federal Reserve revised its Regulation Ds o
that reserve requirement percentages would pertain
only to the amount of deposits at each bank. Form-
erly, the percentage reserve requirements depended
mainly on the geographic location of banks. The net
effect of the change was to lower average required
reserves by about $3.5 billion from what they other-
~vise would have been.
- I
fede;aifumdm Raim Leo, the Discount Role
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Also effective the statement week beginning No-
vember 9, the Federal Reserve modified its Regulation
J governing the schedules according to which mem-
ber bank reserve accounts are debited for checks
drawn on them. The effect of the change was to
reduce the average level of Federal Reserve float — a
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The net effect of the changes in Regulations D and
j in November \vas to release about $1.5 billion of
reserves to the banking system. Prior to these changes
the System announced that the November amend-
ments were not intended to have any impact on the
stance of monetary policy, and that appropriate off-
setting actions would he taken. Such actions would
consist mainly of reductions in Federal Reserve Sys-
tem holdings of U.S. Government securities through
open market sales.
The net effect of all factors affecting the monetary
base in 1972 — including an adjustment for the release
of reserves attributable to the reduction in average
reserve requirements — was to increase the amount
outstanding by $7.5 billion. This represents a rise of
over 8 percent for the year.
The strong economic growth in 1972 was accom-
panied by: (1) a rapid growth in deposits at banks
and other financialintermediaries; (2) a general tend-
ency for short-term market interest rates to rise; and
(3) continued Federal deficits. The analysis here sug-
gests that continued upward pressure on short-term
market interest rates is likely.
The outlook for savings-type deposits in banks and
thrift institutions is less clear. If market interest rates
rise further, the yields mutual savings banks, savings
and loan associations, and banks are permitted to pay
on time and savings-type deposits would tend to be-
come less competitive, Unless ceilings are then raised,
the growth in these deposits is likely to decelerate. In
previous episodes of high and rising market rates of
interest, such as 1.966 and 1969, the growth in time
and savings deposits at financial intermediaries slowed
for a period, and the outstanding volume of some
types of interest bearing deposits actually fell.
The growth of demand deposits at commercial
banks — the main component of the money stock — is
largely dependent on the rate at which commercial
banks acquire reserves to support these deposits. The
growth of total bank reserves depends on the growth
of the monetary base and the desire of the public to
hold currency. The amount of reserves available to
support private demand deposits is influenced by the
growth of time deposits at commercial banks and
short-run fluctuations in demand deposits of the Fed-
eral Government at commercial banks. If there is a
tendency for the growth of time deposits to slow as
market interest rates rise further, these deposits will
absorb reserves at a slower rate (increasing the base-
money multiplier). Thus, for a given growth of the
base or total reserves, more reserves will be available
to support growth of demand deposits.
The growth of the base over time is largely de-
termined by Federal Reserve System open market
operations and by changes in the amount of member
bank borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks. In the
past these factors have tended to be related to move-
snents in market interest rates in the short run. The
released Record of Policy Actions of the FOMC in re-
cent years has shown a continuation of the desire by
monetary authorities to moderate near-term tenden-
cies for market interest rates to rise. As demand forces
have tended to raise market rates on past occasions, the
System Open Market Account Manager, in accord-
ance with FOMC instructions, has responded by in-
creasing purchases of securities in the market in order
to dampen the immediate upward pressure on rates.
Such actions have resulted in an increase in the rate
of monetary expansion. This observation of past ex-
perience indicates there may be problems for policy-
makers in achieving their dual objectives of maintain-
ing a moderate rate of growth of the money stock
while also seeking to resist tendencies for short-term
market interest rates to rise.
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